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Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): An
Ineffective Response to the Foreign Terrorist
Fighter Phenomenon
CORY KOPITZKE*
ABSTRACT
Thousands of foreign terrorist fighters poured into the Middle East
from almost every country across the globe. Radicalized by professionally
edited videos and propaganda disseminated through the Internet, people
from all walks of life were captivated by the Islamic State's rhetoric, and
nations were struggling to figure out how to stop them. One solution
came in the form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution-
Resolution 2178 (2014). This resolution is directed specifically at foreign
terrorist fighters and calls upon all Member States to act with haste to
address this new phenomenon. Critics were quick to call into question the
language of Resolution 2178, however, with some claiming that it had
the potential to give credibility to disastrous human rights violations by
oppressive governments. This note examines those critiques and suggests
that the actual problems of Resolution 2178 lie not in its potential for
abuse but in the failure of states to implement its dictates-stemming
from a lack of both political will and capability. As a potential solution,
this note suggests that states should focus their efforts on one specific
directive of Resolution 2178, countering and preventing violent
extremism.
INTRODUCTION
The world is facing the "largest global convergence" of foreign
terrorist fighters (FTFs) in history.I The number of fighters from across
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the globe who have traveled to the Middle East to join terrorist groups
is unprecedented in scale 2 and hard to estimate with any accuracy.3
Moreover, the groups to which fighters are flowing-such as the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Islamic State) and the Al-Nusra
Front-are sophisticated, dangerous, and wealthy. 4
The acts of these terrorist groups have been described as "medieval
savagery."5 The mention of ISIS conjures up images of mass executions;
the beheadings of civilians, including journalists and aid workers; and
the destruction of precious historical sites and artifacts spread across
the Fertile Crescent. While broadcast on daily news outlets, these
images come to mind, in part, because they have been distributed across
all forms of social media and the Internet-in combination with stories
of adventure and religious salvation-in an attempt to recruit fighters
to join ISIS's efforts in the Middle East.6 And the group's efforts have
paid off. Numbers have varied depending on the institution conducting
the estimates, but, in May of 2016, the United Nations projected-based
on a report from one Member State-that around thirty-eight thousand
individuals may have attempted to travel to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.7
It was against this backdrop of barbarity and the influx of FTFs
from across the globe that nations convened at the urging of President
Obama to come up with a solution to curb the flow of FTFs to the Middle
East.8 The product of this meeting was Security Council Resolution 2178
1. HOMELAND SEC. COMM., FINAL REP. OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST
AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL 6 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter HOMELAND SEC. REPORT].
2. See GLOBAL CTR. ON COOP. SEC. ET AL., ADDRESSING THE FOREIGN TERRORIST
FIGHTERS PHENOMENON FROM A EUROPEAN UNION PERSPECTIVE: UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 2178, LEGAL ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EU FOREIGN
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1 (2014) [hereinafter EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE].
3. See GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
FOREIGN FIGHTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 9 (2014) [hereinafter GENEVA ACADEMY].
4. See Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, STANFORD UNIV. (last
updated Apr. 4, 2016), http/web.stanfrd.edulgroup/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1 ("In
summer 2014, some estimates claimed that ISIS was worth up to $2 billion. As of
September 2014, experts estimated that ISIS's oil revenues alone brought in between $1
million and $2 million per day.").
5. See Brett LoGiurato, John Kerry: ISIS' Beheading of Steven Sotloff Was an "Act of
Medieval Savagery", BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/john-kerry-on-steven-sotloffs-killing-by-isis-2014-9.
6. See JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR, 81-85 (2015).
7. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Threat Posed by
ISIL (Da'esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts
in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, 1| 18, U.N. Doc. S/2016/501 (May
31, 2016) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General].
8. See NAUREEN CHOWDHURY FINK, COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY AND THE IMPACT OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2178 (2014).
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(2014),9 which has been referred to by some as the "watershed in the
global civilian effort to reduce the threat from foreign terrorist fighters .
. . in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere."1 0 Adopted unanimously," Resolution
2178 obligates all countries to institute laws that criminalize the travel
or attempted travel for terrorism purposes, and it requires states to
suppress and prevent the organizing, recruiting, transporting, and
equipping of FTFs along with the financing of their activities. 12
Moreover, Resolution 2178 urges states to counter violent extremism
(CVE) and cooperate with other states in information and intelligence
sharing.13
On paper, Resolution 2178 seems like a positive and comprehensive
strategy to curb the flow of FTFs to the Middle East, yet since its
adoption, the number of FTFs has increased by fifty percent.1 4 Today,
estimates show that FTFs have poured into Syria and other nations
from over one hundred different countries. 15 Based on recently released
classified data, which does not count soldiers who have died on the
battlefield or returned to their home country, 250 people from the
United States, 1,550 French nationals, 700 people from the United
Kingdom, and over 1,700 people from Russia and former Soviet States
are currently estimated to be fighting in Iraq and Syria.16
While coalition forces have reportedly killed many fighters-by
some estimates reducing ISIS's fighting force to twelve thousand1 7-the
terrorist organization has not been strategically or permanently
weakened.' 8 In fact, the threat from ISIS remains high and has
continued to diversify.' 9 Member States have reported a clear increase
9. S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).
10. SEAN DAVIS, RESPONDING TO FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS: A RISK-BASED
PLAYBOOK FOR STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1 (2014).
11. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts
Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel,
Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters, U.N. Press Release SC/11580 (Sept. 24, 2014).
12. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 1 9.
13. See id. 11 11, 18.
14. See HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 ("Based on the 58 cases we
reviewed, there have been sharp increases in the number of Americans trying to travel to
Syria each succeeding year (50 percent in 2015), indicating that coalition airstrikes in the
region have not dissuaded travelers.").
15. See id. at 36.
16. See id. at 11-12.
17. William M. Arkin & Robert Windrem, ISIS Numbers Drop, but Fighters Now
Attacking Around the World, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2016, 9:54 AM), http://www.nbenews.com
/storyline/isis-uncoveredlisis-numbers-drop-fighters-now-attacking-around-world-n604206.
18. See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 7, 1 4.
19. Id.
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in the rate of returnees from Iraq and Syria. 20 Indeed, thirty percent of
those who have fought in the war zone have returned to their home
nations-roughly three thousand ISIS fighters per month.21 Recent
international attacks perpetrated by members of ISIS additionally show
that the group is changing its strategy. 22
In the months following its adoption, numerous legal scholars, think
tanks, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) underscored some
of the suspected problems with Resolution 2178, and reports by the
United Nations and other governments have analyzed the efforts by
states to comply with their obligations of the resolution. 23 Nevertheless,
little research has been done to determine whether the concerns and
potential problems proposed have materialized. Thus, this note is an
attempt to fill that gap by examining the previously argued problems
posed by adopting Resolution 2178 and then offering an outline of the
issues that have actually materialized, which can then be used for
further research regarding the FTF problem.
This note addresses both the anticipated and actual flaws of
Resolution 2178 as a global, legal, and political solution to the FTF
problem. Part I examines Resolution 2178, including its adoption
history, its obligations, and the other Security Council Resolutions it is
meant to complement. Part II lays out the perceived issues with
Resolution 2178 identified by commentators immediately following its
adoption-specifically its potential to exacerbate human rights
violations by governments that choose to misuse the dictates of the
resolution. Part III shows how the human rights concerns presented by
critics in Part II have not materialized and surveys the problems of the
resolution that have actually emerged-focusing specifically on the
ineffectiveness of the resolution as a solution to the FTF problem. Part
IV then provides an outline and critique of many of the alternative
approaches to the FTF problem that have been urged by scholars and
20. See id.
21. See Arkin & Windrem, supra note 17.
22. See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 7, 1 5.
23. See, e.g., HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1; Raimonda Murmokaite (Chair of
the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001)
Concerning Counter-Terrorism), Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178
(2014) by States Affected by Foreign Terrorist Fighters, U.N. Doc. S/2015/338 (May. 14,
2015) [hereinafter First Report]; Raimonda Murmokaite (Chair of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-
Terrorism), Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) by States Affected
by Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Second Report, S/2015/683 (Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
Second Report]; Raimonda Murmokaite (Chair of the Security Council Committee
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism),
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) by States Affected by Foreign
Terrorist Fighters: Third Report, S/2015/975 (Dec. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Third Report].
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policy makers alike, including radicalization prevention, de-
radicalization strategies, and counter narratives. Part IV shows how
those strategies can actually be effective at stopping the flow of FTFs
and preventing attacks by returning fighters. In short, this note argues
that, while an honest attempt to stop the flow of FTFs to the Middle
East, Resolution 2178 has proven to be unsuccessful in many of its
objectives.
I. THE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER PROBLEM AND RESOLUTION 2178
In general, FTFs are not a new problem for states. 24 FTFs traveled
to Afghanistan after the Soviets invaded in 1989, and they united in the
Balkans in the early 1990s to fight in the Bosnian conflicts. 25 What is
new today is the global scale of their recruiting efforts, their ability to
reach individuals directly, and their sophistication in attracting new
recruits. 26 More specifically, the instability in Syria and Iraq has turned
the problem into more of a "global crisis," 27 with fighters traveling from
more than half the countries in the world. 28 Terrorists have also begun
to heavily use social media and obscure Internet sites to recruit new
members, allowing groups to disseminate their message of terror across
the globe in real time. 29
The threat of the FTF is also somewhat different than that posed by
previous foreign fighters. 0 Today, the concern for many governments-
primarily Western governments- is "blowback, " or the fear that FTFs
will return to their country of origin to commit terrorist attacks after
participating in combat and training activities in Syria or elsewhere. 31
24. See EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2, at 1.
25. See Third Report, supra note 23, 1 139.
26. See Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, supra note 4.
27. Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to Confront Threat of Syrian
Foreign Fighters, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (July 8, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
attorney-general-holder-urges-international-effort-confront-threat-syrian-foreign-fighters.
28. See Eric Schmitt & Somini Sengupta, Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite
Global Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/
middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?_r-0.
29. See CHRISTINA S. LIANG, CYBER JIHAD: UNDERSTANDING AND COUNTERING ISLAMIC
STATE PROPAGANDA 2 (2015).
30. See generally Daniel Byman & Jeremy Shapiro, Homeward Bound? Don't Hype the
Threat of Returning Jihadists, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 37 (2014) (investigating whether the hype
surrounding returning foreign fighters is credible through an analysis of the numbers of
fighters both leaving and re-entering the West and the impact this has had on bolstering
the ISIS fight).
31. See generally ASIM QURESHI, BLOWBACK - FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE THREAT
THEY POSE (2014) (describing the "blowback" phenomenon, a concern that those British
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In fact, this concern was one of the main motivations behind the
introduction of Resolution 2178, with President Obama reinforcing to
Member States at the Security Council that "foreign fighters were likely
to return to their home countries to carry out attacks." 32 Tony Abbott,
former Prime Minister of Australia, noted at the time that twenty
people had returned to Australia from fighting in Middle East "disposed
to wreak havoc," 33 and Stephen Harper, former Prime Minister of
Canada, warned that FTFs would return home to motivate and recruit
others to carry out attacks. 34 And it seems that this fear has been
realized, with FTFs returning to their home countries at a rate of
twenty to thirty percent in recent months.35
A. Security Council Resolutions and Attempts to Deal with Terrorism
Before Resolution 2178
Terrorism, including international and transnational terrorism is
not a new concern for states.3 6 The United Nations began to address
international terrorism in the 1960s in the form of agreements among
Member States that held parties accountable for terrorist acts. 37 Then,
in the 1990s, the U.N. Security Council passed several resolutions,
which sought to implement sanctions for state-sponsored terrorism and
persuade all Member States to work together to prevent all acts of
terrorism.38 In the years following the September 11 attacks, the
citizens who fight in Syria will return to the UK and actively take part in hostilities
against the government).
32. Press Release, supra note 11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See THE SOUFAN GROup, The Murky Challenge of Returning Foreign Fighters (Dec.
9, 2015), http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-murky-challenge-of-returning-foreign-
fighters/.
36. See Laura E. Little, Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
37. See,. e.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969).
38. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 8, 1991) (deploring the threats made by Iraq in the
Gulf Conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of
hostages by Iraq); S.C. Res. 1054 (Apr. 26, 1996) (implementing sanctions against the
Sudan for not complying with Security Council Resolution 1044 (Jan. 31, 1996), which
demanded the extradition to Ethiopia of three suspects wanted in connection with an
assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt); S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999)
(deciding that all States "[fjreeze funds and other financial resources, including funds
derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban . . . ."); S.C. Res. 1269
(Oct. 19, 1999) (calling upon all States "to implement fully the international anti-terrorist
conventions to which they are parties, encourage all States to consider as a matter of
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Security Council's strategy changed as it moved more urgently to adopt
resolutionS 39 that would address what was becoming the "new
challenge" for states-"large-scale international terrorism, in the
context of highly complex and increasingly global networks." 40 These
global networks of terrorists are a product of globalization, 41 as these
groups recognized and began to exploit the global availability of
information for their own logistical purposes.42
Resolution 1373 (2001) was one of the first resolutions adopted by
the Security Council after the September 11 attacks. 43 It obligates
Member States to "prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts"
and calls on states to become parties to "relevant international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism." 44 It also established
the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). 45 In
addition to Resolution 1373, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1455 (2003), which requests that states enforce and pass legislation to
prevent their nationals and others operating in their territories from
aiding the Taliban and Al-Qaida. 46 The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1540 (2004), in which the Security Council decided that "all.
States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in
particular for terrorist purposes." 47 And, finally, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1624 (2005), which calls upon States to do the
following:
cooperate, inter alia, to strengthen the security of their
international borders, including by combating
fraudulent travel documents and, to the extent
attainable, by enhancing terrorist screening and
priority adhering to those to which they are not parties, and encourage also the speedy
adoption of the pending conventions").
39. See S.C. Res. 1368, 1111 1, 3 (Sept. 12, 2001) (condemning the attacks on September
11, 2001).
40. Hans Koechler, Professor and Chairman, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of
Innsbruck/Austria, Lecture Delivered at the International Conference on International
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Cooperation: The United Nations and International
Terrorism: Challenges to Collective Security (Nov. 15, 2002).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
44. Id. 111 1(a), 3(d).
45. See id. 1 6.
46. See S.C. Res. 1455, ¶ 5 (Jan. 17, 2003).
47. S.C. Res. 1540, 11 2 (Apr. 28, 2004).
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passenger security procedures . . . to enhance dialogue
and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an
effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different
religions and cultures, and to take all measures as may
be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with
their obligations under international law to counter
incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and
intolerance and to prevent the subversion of educational,
cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and
their supporters.48
In 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1989, which
imposes sanctions on Al-Qaeda and encourages Member States to
submit the names of individuals and groups associated with the
terrorist organization to the CTC. 49 It also reaffirms that "terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious
threats to peace and security."5 0
B. The Emergence of the Islamic State and the Need to Address the FTF
Problem
As the resolutions mentioned above show, the Security Council has
been concerned with and has attempted to address terrorism-in its
many forms-for quite some time. However, as the Islamic State grew
in numbers and Member States began to see their citizens flee to the
Middle East to join its ranks, they recognized the 'particular and
urgent need' to prevent the travel [of| and support for [FTFs]."51
Thus, in 2014, the Security Council introduced two resolutions
aimed at suppressing the flow of FTFs, Resolution 217052 and
Resolution 2178.53 Resolution 2170 is directed at, among other things,
the financing of foreign terrorist fighters. For example, it notes that "all
48. S.C. Res. 1624, 11 2-3, (Sept. 14, 2005).
49. See S.C. Res. 1989, 1 (June 17, 2011).
50. Id. at 1. In addition to the several Security Council Resolutions mentioned, there
are also several treaties on specific acts of terrorism. See, e.g., Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. 7570 (sabotaging airplanes); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192 (hijacking);
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284,
37 I.L.M. 249 (Dec. 15, 1997) (bombing); G.A. Res. 54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000) (terrorism
financing).
51. See Press Release, supra note 11.
52. S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014).
53. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9.
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States shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources
are made available, directly or indirectly for the benefit of ISIL, ANF or
any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with
Al-Qaida." 54 It also emphasizes that States should comply "with their
obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their
territory do not make donations to individuals and entities" in these
groups.55
Many of the provisions of the earlier resolutions mentioned above
have also been repeated in Resolutions 2170 and 2178. For example,
Resolution 1373's obligation that Member States "shall prevent and
suppress the financing of terrorist acts,"56 is repeated in both Resolution
2170 and 2178.57 Additionally, the Security Council confirmed that both
Resolutions 2170 and 2178 make FTFs and their associates eligible for
inclusion on sanctions lists set down in Resolutions 2167 and 1989.58
Resolutions 2170 and 2178 also complement each other in certain
respects. They were adopted specifically for the FTF phenomenon, with.
Resolution 2170 aimed broadly at the suppression of recruitment and
financing of terrorists and Resolution 2178 focused directly on specific
actions Member States should take, such as criminalization of travel for
terrorism purposes.59 Perhaps most meaningfully, both resolutions
emphasize the need to improve the effectiveness of fighting terrorism on
the global level,6 0 and both have highlighted the use of advanced
technology by terrorists to recruit and commit terrorist acts in a
"globalized society."61
C. Resolution 2178
The Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, thus making many of its provisions binding
on all U.N. Member States. 62 It is modeled on a draft resolution
submitted by the United States and pulls material from the Hague
Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective
Response to the FTF Phenomenon, developed by the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).63 The resolution imposes new and
54. S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, 1 12.
55. Id. 1 15.
56. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 43, 1 1(a).
57. S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, 1 5; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 1 6.
58. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, 1 14; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 1 20.
59. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, 1 9; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 1 6.
60. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, at 2; S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 1.
61. S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 52, at 2.
62. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3, at 42.
63. See id. at 38.
317
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 24:1
extensive obligations on Member States, reflecting the significance of
the international terrorism threat. It also reaffirms what other
terrorism-related resolutions in the past have found-namely, "that
terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of
terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their
motivations." 64
Many paragraphs of Resolution 2178 are, thus, not novel. 65
However, the resolution is unique in its focus on FTFs, and, in
particular, on "the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Al-
Nusrah Front (ANF) and other cells, affiliates, splinter groups or
derivatives of Al-Qaida."66 Moreover, for the first time in a resolution,
the Security Council defines what it means by a FTF:
individuals who travel to a State other than their States
of residence or nationality for the purpose of the
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or
receiving of terrorist training, including in connection
with armed conflict.67
Using this definition, the Security Council requires Member States
to take different actions in three broad sections under their general duty
to "prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or
equipping of [FTFs]."65 The first section focuses on the need for Member
States to implement better border controls and issue travel documents
with better care, "preventing [their] counterfeiting, forgery or
fraudulent use."69 The second section urges Member States to share
information "regarding actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist
networks, including foreign terrorist fighters."70 Finally, the third
section calls upon states to counter violent extremism by preventing the
"radicalization to terrorism"7 1  and implement "prosecution,
64. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 1.
65. See Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The 'Foreign Terrorist
Fighter" as an International Legal Person, Part I, EJIL: TALK! BLOG EUR. J. INT'L L. (Nov.
20, 2014), http-I/www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighter-
as-an-international-legal-person-part-i/.
66. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Id. 1¶ 5.
69. Id. 11 2.
70. Id. 11 3.
71. Id. 1 4.
318
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2178 (2014)
rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign
terrorist fighters." 72
Resolution 2178 also contains numerous specific obligations and
encouragements, of which operative paragraph 6 is, perhaps, the most
controversial. In that paragraph, the Security Council
decides that all States shall ensure that their domestic
laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses
sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to
penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of
the offense: (a) their nationals who travel or attempt to
travel to a State other than their States of residence or
nationality [to plan or commit terrorist acts or receive
terrorist training]; (b) the wilful provision or collection . .
. of funds by their nationals or in their territories with
the intention that the funds should be used . . . to
finance [FTFs or the planning or perpetration of
terrorist acts]; and, (c) the wilful organization, or other
facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their
nationals or in their territories, of the travel of
individuals who travel to a State other than their States
of residence or nationality for the purpose of the
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or
receiving of terrorist training. 73
Some of the commentators below argue that this provision is both
unenforceable and provides a tool for oppressive regimes that choose to
define terrorism as anything they do not like or find potentially
threatening, religiously or politically. 74
As mentioned above, Resolution 2178 also asks Member States to
focus on countering violent extremism (CVE).75 For the first time in a
Chapter VII resolution, the prevention of radicalization is described as
an "essential element" of tackling the threat of FTFs.76 Specifically,
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
74. See Martin Scheinin, Back to Post-9/11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on
Foreign Terrorist Fighters, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 2014, 2:54 PM), https//wwwjustsecu
rity.org/15407/post-911-panic-securityouncil-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/; Kent Roach
& Carmen Cheung, UN Wants to Battle Islamic State, but Is It Fighting Freedom?, GLDBE & MAI,
(Oct. 2, 2014, 12:45 PM),http//www.theglobeandmailcorm/opinion/un-wants-to-battle-is-but-is-it-
fighting-freedom/article2890383/.
75. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 11 15-19.
76. FINK, supra note 8, at 3-4.
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operative paragraph 16 encourages Member States to "promote social
inclusion and cohesion"77 and to empower "youth, families, women,
religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups
of civil society. ."78
Resolution 2178 requires Member States to implement and
maintain effective border controls and to regulate the issuance of travel
documents.79 Under operative paragraph 2, the Security Council
commands Member States to take measures to prevent the
counterfeiting or forgery of travel documents and identity papers.80
Indeed, this requirement makes sense, as the 9/11 Commission found
that "[flor terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons."8 '
Resolution 2178 advises Member States to share information and
cooperate on operational practices. For example, the Security Council
urges Member States to exchange information regarding the movements
of terrorists or terrorist groups "through bilateral or multilateral
mechanisms" 82 and, at the same time, calls upon Member States to
improve international and regional cooperation to prevent travel of
FTFs.83 Moreover, the Security Council recalls its decision in Resolution
1373-that Member States must provide each other the "greatest
measure of assistance" in criminal investigations and proceedings
regarding the financing or supporting of terrorism-while highlighting
this requirement's importance with respect to FTFs.84
Finally, Member States are obligated under operative paragraph 9
to require airlines operating in their territories to provide "advance
passenger information" to national authorities. This requirement allows
Member States to detect attempted entries and departures into their
countries of individuals designated by the CTC under authority granted
in Resolutions 1267 and 1989.85 Advance passenger information would
77. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, ¶ 16.
78. Id.
79. See id. 11 2.
80. Id. In this provision, the Security Council appears to be building on "Good Practice
#13" of The Hague Marrakech Memorandum, which suggests that states "[ulse all
available tools to prevent the misuse of travel documents ... to deny suspected FTFs the
ability to travel to engage in terrorist activities." GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM,
"FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS" (FF) INITIATIVE: THE HAGUE-MARRAKECH MEMORANDUM ON
GOOD PRACTICES FORAMORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE T THE FTF PHENOMENON 6-7.
81. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 384 (2004).
82. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 11 3.
83. Id. 11 11.
84. Id. 1 12.
85. Id. 11 9.
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include a passenger's flight information and information provided by the
passenger at check-in, including his or her name and date of birth.86
II. INITIAL REACTIONS TO AND CRITIQUES OF RESOLUTION 2178
Resolution 2178 has been described as President Obama's "legacy"
in the Security Council.87 Nevertheless, numerous scholars rushed to
provide commentary on its potential negative implications.
The Resolution received much criticism for its language. As noted
above, the Resolution is not without provisions reminding Member
States of their obligations under international law-particularly,
international human rights law. However, critics argued that
Resolution 2178 left room for some undesirable interpretations.88 For
example, many individuals were concerned that while the Resolution
defines FTF, it does not-like other resolutions before it-define
terrorism.8 9 Critics have discussed extensively the political difficulties
inherent in defining international terrorism. They argue that Resolution
2178 requires agreement on this point because of the extensive legal
obligations imposed on Member States, particularly the obligation in
operative paragraph 6 to enact "serious criminal offenses"9 0 to prosecute
FTFs.91 Scholars worried that this omission would allow regimes to
define "terrorism" as "whatever they do not like-for instance political
opposition, trade unions, religious movements, minority or indigenous
groups." 92
Critics thus argue for amendments to Resolution 2178 that would
limit governments' ability to classify individuals or groups as terrorists.
Martin Scheinin-the first United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights and Counterterrorism-suggests that instead of
classifying as threats "terrorism in all forms and manifestations," the
Security Council should limit the threat to "international terrorism or
86. See HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 64 n.224.
87. See generally Hayes Brown, How Obama Decided to Make Terrorist Recruitment
His U.N. Priority, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 24, 2014), httpJ/thinkprogress.org/world/2014/09/24/
3570460/obama-unse-foreign-fighters/ (discussing President Obama's efforts to pass a U.N.
resolution to combat ISIS FTFs).
88. See Scheinin, supra note 74.
89. See id.
90. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 1 6.
91. ICCT Commentaries: The New Security Council Resolution 2178 on Foreign
Terrorist Fighters: A Missed Opportunity for a Holistic Approach, TERRORIST INFO. PORTAL
(Nov. 8, 2014), https://terroristinformation.wordpress.com/2014/11/08/icct-commentaries-
the-new-security-council-resolution-2178-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters-a-missed-
opportunity-for-a-holistic-approach/ [hereinafter ICCT Commentaries].
92. Scheinin, supra note 74.
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specific forms of it."93 He recommends including operative paragraph 3
of Security Council Resolution 1566 as a definition of international
terrorism. 94 He argues that this definition would potentially address
many human rights scholars' concerns by constraining the governments
to prosecute acts that "constitute offences within the scope of and as
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism." 95
Emilio De Capitani agrees with Scheinin, describing the call for
Member States to simultaneously criminalize FTFs' activities and
comply with international human rights law "rhetorical" in nature.96 De
Capitani also stresses the concerns highlighted by Sandra
Kraehenmann and others at the Geneva Academy.97 He notes that one
provision in the definition used by the Security Council to describe
FTFs-which says that FTFs are those who travel to commit terrorist
attacks or provide terrorist training, "including [training] in connection
with armed conflict"-muddles the line between terrorism and armed
conflict, and, thus, potentially infringes upon international
humanitarian law.9 8 In short, the provision declares that acts governed
by international humanitarian law are "terrorist acts," but it does not
limit that term to acts prohibited by international humanitarian law,
like the execution of individuals hors de combat.99
III. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS: ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF RESOLUTION
2178
Since Resolution 2178's adoption, many Member States have taken
legislative and administrative action in their attempts to comply with
the obligations set down in the Resolution, while others have used
existing laws to suppress the flow of FTFs. 0 0 After reviewing the
actions of Member States and these new and existing laws, it seems
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. S.C. Res. 1566, 1 3 (Oct. 8, 2004).
96. See Emilio De Capitani, 'Toreign Fighters" and EU Implementation of the UNSC
Resolution 2178. Another Case of 'Legislate in Haste, Repent at Leisure . . ."? (1),
EUROPEAN AREA OF FREEDOM SECURITY & JUSTICE: FREE GROUP (April 6, 2015),
http://free-group.eul2015/04/06/foreign-fighters-and-eu-implementation-of-the-unse-
resolution-2178-another-case-of-legislate-in-haste-repent-at-leisure-l/.
97. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3.
98. See De Capitani, supra note 97.
99. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3, at 42.
100. For a description of actions taken by Member States since the adoption of
Resolution 2178, see First Report, supra note 23; Second Report, supra note 23; Third
Report, supra note 23.
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that the fears and criticisms of Resolution 2178-specifically with
regard to human rights-are unfounded. While the potential for human
rights violations is present, it is no more so than with any previous
resolution. In short, the true issue with Resolution 2178 is not its
exacerbation of human rights concerns, but instead, its ineffectiveness
at stopping FTFs from traveling across the globe. This part of the note,
nevertheless, shows how Resolution 2178 could exacerbate human
rights concerns-even though none have been specifically documented-
and highlights the ineffectiveness of the document at meeting its
ultimate objective.
A. Language Regarding Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Contrary to many of the arguments made above, the Security
Council never disregarded the concerns Member States or others might
have had about the potential for the provisions in Resolution 2178 to be
abused. On the contrary, the Resolution's language is quite strong on
human rights, stronger than Resolution 1373, for example. 0 1 Moreover,
the broad support the Resolution received at adoption was partly due to
its incorporation of language protecting human rights and assurances of
compliance with international humanitarian law.102
First, Resolution 2178 lays out Member States' obligations under
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and
international refugee law in its preamble, 03 even noting that the failure
to comply with these laws "is one of the factors contributing to increased
radicalization. . . ."104 Moreover, the Security Council recognized that
respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law supports
counterterrorism measures. 05
Throughout the preamble, the Security Council reminds Member
States of their responsibility to respect fundamental freedoms under
human rights law. For example-in underscoring its concern that
terrorists are using technology to incite radicalism-the Security
Council encourages Member States to take action to stop this trend but
to do so while respecting human rights and other international legal
obligations. 06 In the same vein, the Security Council calls upon Member
States to ensure FTFs do not abuse refugee status, with the
101. See FINK, supra note 8, at 3.
102. Id. at 4.
103. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 1-2.
104. Id. at 2.
105. See id. at 1-2.
106. See id. at 2-3.
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requirement that Member States only do so "in conformity with
international human rights law and international refugee law."10 7
Additionally, many operative paragraphs contain prefatory
language regarding the need to follow international human rights law.
For instance, operative paragraph 5-the provision that "decides" that
Members States shall prevent the recruiting, organizing, and traveling
of FTFs-introduces that obligation with the requirement that those
measures be taken "consistent with international human rights law,
international refugee law, and international humanitarian law."108
Thus, Resolution 2178 contains ample language reminding Members
States of their responsibilities to protect fundamental freedoms and
human rights in general.
B. Travel Document Revocations and Travel Restrictions as Potential
Human Rights Issues
One of the easiest ways for a Member State to "prevent the
movement of terrorists or terrorist groups"109 is to restrict the issuance
of passports or to revoke them from citizens they suspect are acting or
attempting to act as FTFs. States are using this practice today to
prevent suspected fighters from exiting and entering their territories.1 10
Canada, for instance, has been invalidating passports prior to the
adoption of resolution 2178,111 using existing regulations that allow
administrators to deny or revoke passports when there is evidence that
an individual will travel to commit a crime. 112 Australia is another
nation that took preemptive action by using existing laws to revoke
passports of suspected returning jihadists. 113 At the time of the
resolution's adoption, Australia had already suspended the passports of
at least sixty of its citizens, 114 with that number up to at least 115 at the
time of writing. 115 Meanwhile, France has passed legislation that allows
the government to prohibit individuals from leaving the country for up
to six months-with the ability to be renewed indefinitely-if it believes
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. 11 5.
109. Id. 11 2.
110. See Stewart Bell, Canadian Government Begins Invalidating Passports of Citizens
Who Have Left to Join Extremist Groups, NATIONAL POST (Sept. 20, 2014), http://news.natio
nalpost.com/news/Canada/canadian-government-revoking-passportsof-citizens-trymg-to-join-
extremist-groups.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Press Release, supra note 11.
114. See Bell, supra note 111.
115. See Second Report, supra note 23, 1 96.
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that the individual intends to commit terrorist acts abroad.11 6Yet,
suspected terrorists without passports have still attempted other
methods of leaving the country. For example, in May of 2016, five men
on a terrorist watch list were apprehended by Australian police as they
attempted to set sail for Syria in a seven-meter fiberglass boat.117
Other Member States have passed new legislation after the
adoption of Resolution 2178. The United Kingdom passed the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 18 in early 2015, which allows for the seizure
and temporary retention of travel documents for up to fourteen days of
individuals attempting to leave the territory for terrorism-related
purposes. 119 That period can be extended to thirty days with judicial
approval. 120 The Act also includes temporary exclusion orders, which
permit officials to cancel the passports of U.K. nationals and to exclude
them from the territory by placing them on international and domestic
no-fly lists for up to two years. 121
One hundred sixty-eight countries have ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects an individual's
right to freedom of movement. 122 And the Member States of the Council
of Europe have signed Protocol 4 to the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
also protects the freedom of movement. 123 These laws assure an
individual's right to leave his or her country, restricted only by lawful
means in the attempt to achieve a legitimate goal, which includes
116. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3, at 59.
117. See Euan McKirdy, Five Terror Suspects Caught Trying to Flee Australia to Syria
by Boat, CNN (May 11, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/11/asia/australians-
boat-syria-bound/.
118. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 c. 6 (Eng.).
119. See Shaheed Fatima QC, Travel Bans and Due Regard: The UK's New Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.justsecu
rity.org/20467/uk-law-counter-terrorism-security-act-2015. At least one state in West Africa
confiscates the passports of individuals suspected of attempting to become foreign terrorist
fighters. See Third Report, supra note 23, at 21.
120. See Fatima QC, supra note 120.
121. See CHARLES LISTER, RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS: CRIMINALIZATION OR
REINTEGRATION? 5 (2015).
122. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 71.
123. Eur. Ct. of Hum. Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.], Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2 (Apr. 16, 1993); see also
Org. of African Unity [OAU], African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art.
12 (June 27, 1981) ("Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including
his own, and to return to his country."); Org. of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights, 'Pact of San Jose", art. 22 (Nov. 22, 1969) ("Every person has the right to
leave any country freely, including his own.").
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national security. 124 The restrictions must be necessary to achieve that
goal-meaning the restrictions are subject to the principle of
proportionality, and thus should be the least intrusive means available
to achieve the desired goal. 125 Moreover, an individual must have the
right to appeal any decision restricting his freedom of movement, and
this appeal should evaluate the legitimacy of and the substantive
reasons for the decision. 126
The new and existing legislation used by Member States to restrict
passports and travel, therefore, interferes with the right to freedom of
movement set out under these treaties. Nevertheless, as noted, Member
States are allowed to interfere if the substantive and procedural
requirements are met. Thus, while the right may be interfered with as
states attempt to comply with the obligations set down in Resolution
2178, nothing in the resolution itself causes a violation of the right to
freedom of movement, and states can lawfully restrict travel in the
name of national security.
The Security Council has conducted three reports on Member
States' implementation of measures to comply with Resolution 2178,127
and in those reports it discovered at least one potential human rights
concern with regard to passport and travel restrictions. It found that
one country had introduced legislation that would allow its Minister of
Foreign Affairs to declare certain overseas areas '"no-go zones,"'
whereby citizens commit an offence just by traveling there with no
legitimate purpose.1 28 There need be no intention to commit terrorist
attacks. 129 Nevertheless, there have been no documented instances of
states abusing the dictates of Resolution 2178 with regard to freedom of
movement.
C. Citizenship Revocation and Statelessness
Member States are also using citizenship revocation to restrict
travel by suspected FTFs, and this method-like the revocation of travel
documents-poses numerous legal issues. While Member States used
this tool prior to the adoption of Resolution 2178, they have expanded
124. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3, at 59-60.
125. See id. at 60.
126. See id.
127. For an indication of the specific measures taken by Member States to comply with
Resolution 2178, see First Report, supra note 23; Second Report, supra note 23; Third
Report, supra note 23.
128. Second Report, supra note 23, 1 93.
129. See id. 1 95.
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its use in an attempt to stop FTFs and comply with the resolution. 30
States are usually free to regulate citizenship; 13 1 however, international
law, particularly human rights law, can limit states' decisions of
citizenship deprivation. 3 2 States cannot arbitrarily deprive their
citizens of nationality or forbid them from entering their own country.1 33
Nationality, like the freedom of movement, is a fundamental right that
can only be restricted under a very particular set of conditions.1 34
Specifically, deprivation must be proportional, and the individual must
have the ability to challenge it.135
Only sixty-seven ratifying states are prohibited from depriving an
individual of citizenship if that decision would render him stateless
under the 1961 Statelessness Convention, with a minimal exception
allowed when the conduct of the individual is "seriously prejudicial to
the vital interests of the State."13 6 That exception, however, must have
already been on the books of the domestic law of the state at the passing
of the Convention-meaning that exception is essentially granted - a
grandfather clause.1 37 On the other hand, some conventions-such as
the European Convention on Nationality-do not even permit this
exception when it renders the individual stateless.1 38 Additionally, the
U.N. Secretary-General recently noted that "[g]iven the severity of the
consequences where statelessness results, it may be difficult to justify
loss or deprivation resulting in statelessness in terms of
proportionality." 139
The CTC has found that several European Union States have
passed legislation allowing for citizenship revocation, with one Member
State having "the legal basis to revoke the citizenship of an individual
who has obtained that citizenship through naturalization, even if it
would render him or her stateless."1 40 Many other member states, such
as Canada, have passed legislation permitting them to revoke the
130. See First Report, supra note 23, ¶ 52.
131. See Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 20 (Apr. 6).
132. See id. at 21.
133. See U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of
Nationality, 1 20, UN Doc. AfHRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009).
134. See Human Rights Council Res. 10/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/13, at I 1 (Mar.
26, 2009).
135. See U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of
Nationality, 11 31-34, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013).
136. Audrey Macklin, Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the
Production of the Alien, 40 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 13 (2014) (Can.).
137. See id. at 14.
138. See European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166, art. VII, 1 3.
139. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 136, ¶ 4.
140. See Second Report, supra note 23, 1 73.
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citizenship of dual nationals who have been convicted of major crimes at
home or abroad.1 4 1
Some FTFs may not have the opportunity to contest their
citizenship revocation, as they may be abroad when the decision is made
and, thus, not know that their citizenship has been revoked or miss the
chance to file an appeal.142 However, many FTFs have renounced their
citizenship on their own while fighting for the Islamic State, with some
fighters destroying their passports on arrival.143 Finally, the revocation
of citizenship might not help the problem posed by FTFs if the goal is to
stop the flow of fighters to conflict zones as set out in Resolution 2178.
As the Chair of the CTC noted in his first report, revoking citizenship
may effectively prevent "the return of such individuals to their State of
former citizenship, but they may also simply pass on the associated
problems to the individual's State of remaining citizenship."144
Nevertheless, actual due process and human rights violations with
regard to citizenship revocations-while possible-have yet to
materialize in any of the reports submitted by the CTC.
D. The General Potential for Misuse
Some of the critics mentioned above argued that the language of
Resolution 2178 has the potential for overbroad use by oppressive
regimes with other political motivations. 145 While this is true in theory,
the threat posed by the misuse of Resolution 2178 is no different and no
more severe than the threat posed by previous Security Council
Resolutions. For example, Resolution 1373 was seen as "radical" in
nature, in part, because of its legislative character and the discretion it
141. See id. 1 96.
142. See GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 3, at 57.
143. See, e.g., Shiv Malik, French Isis Fighters Filmed Burning Passports and Calling
for Terror at Home, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2014, 8:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2014/nov/20/french-isis-fighters-filmed-buning-passports-calling-for-terror.
144. First Report, supra note 23, ¶ 52.
145. See Scheinin, supra note 74 (describing how an oppressive regime might use
operative paragraph 6 in ways unintended by the Security Council) ("Let us assume that a
country applies a definition of terrorism that includes organized campaigns of indigenous
groups toward self-determination by non-violent means. Criminalizing the provision of
training to empower these groups, including in the field of human rights, would then be
legitimized by OP6. The repressive regime would refer to its obligations under the UN
Charter to justify a crackdown upon travel, training and funding of organizations and
movements said to constitute a threat to the oppressive regime itself - even when totally
nonviolent. The situation of the Uighurs in China, or the harassment experienced in
recent days by leaders of Russian indigenous communities trying to travel to New York for
the World Conference on indigenous peoples, demonstrate that the above scenario is
totally realistic.").
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gave to Member States in implementing its mandates.1 46 Additionally,
Security Council Resolution 1267 received criticism because of its
potential for due process violations.1 47 Critics argued that Resolution
1267 created a "Kafkaesque predicament" whereby the accused had no
recourse to challenge their inclusion on a U.N. terror sanctions list, and
some individuals had no way of establishing which country had placed
them on the list because the procedures allow governments to secretly
place individuals.1 48
In short, many resolutions have the potential for overbroad use by
Member States, and this is a problem that has existed long before the
adoption of Resolution 2178. The critiques of Resolution 2178 by
scholars such as De Capitani and Scheinin could have just as easily
been made about previous Security Council resolutions. Moreover,
Scheinin's recommendation to include operative paragraph 3 of Security
Council Resolution 1566149 as a definition of international terrorism
does not solve the problem. There has not been-and likely will never
be-a globally accepted definition of terrorism. 5 0 Additionally, the
definition of FTF included in Resolution 2178 is restricted to
"individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or
nationality."' 5 ' Therefore, the FTF problem is defined as an
international problem and limited to international terrorism contrary to
the fears expressed above. Human rights problems created by
counterterrorism measures are not new,1 52 and Resolution 2178 is just
inheriting those problems.
146. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Empire of Security and the Security of Empire, 27
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 241, 254, 263 (2013) (noting how the dictates of Resolution 1373
caused Member States to develop their own varying definitions of terrorism.).
147. See Colum Lynch, The 10 Worst Security Council Resolutions Ever, FOREIGN
POLICY (May 21, 2010), http//foreignpoicy.com/2010/05/21/the-10-worst-u-n-security-council-resol
utions-ever-2/.
148. Id.
149. See Scheinin, supra note 74.
150. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 90; Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Victor Tadros, The
Impossibility of Defining Terrorism, 16 NEw CRIM. L. REv. 494 (2013) (discussing the
difficulty of defining terrorism); Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define
Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011); Reuven Young, Defining
Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its
Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 23 (2006)
(examining the definition of international terrorism).
151. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 2.
152. See Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 249, 266 (2006) (discussing the "equally damaging" response counter-
terrorism measures can have on human rights).
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E. The Actual Problems of Resolution 2178-Practical Restraints
Like many Security Council Resolutions before it, Resolution 2178
fails to achieve its desired ends-in part, because of a failure by Member
States to implement its pronouncements and recommendations.1 53 For
example, some of the most relevant states, where the majority of FTFs
travel to and from, do not have the ability to implement the required
measures, lack the political will to take action, and suffer from endemic
corruption.1 54 Additionally, while some Member States are taking their
obligations under the resolution seriously, implementing new legislation
and tactics to stop the flow of FTFs, some have taken little action with
regard to implementing legislation since the adoption of Resolution
2178.155 Moreover, even the most sophisticated Member States in terms
of counterterrorism technology, such as the United States, are
struggling to stop FTFs before they leave. 156
Most FTFs traveling to Iraq and Syria do not come from Western
States.15 7 Over seventy percent have come from Northern Africa and the
Middle East,158 yet some of these countries do not have functioning
governments, let alone the technical ability to track and stop FTFs.159
The Islamic State is continuing to increase its presence in Northern
Africa, particularly in the failed state of Libya,16 0 which has now also
become a state of destination for FTFs as opposed to only a state of
origin or transit. 16 1 The CTC report on Northern Africa lays out even
more concerns. It shows that at least one Member State has no methods
in place to prevent FTFs from leaving its territory,1 62 and another state
153. See Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council's Anti-
Terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 881, 892
(2006) (discussing the difficulty of implementing the relevant Security Council anti-
terrorism measures by Member States).
154. See Second Report, supra note 23, 11 52.
155. See Third Report, supra note 23, at 2 ("Few States have introduced comprehensive
criminal offences to prosecute foreign terrorist fighter-related preparatory or accessory
acts. Many rely on existing legislation to tackle the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon,
and such legislation may not be sufficient to prevent foreign terrorist fighter travel.").
156. See HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
157. See id. at 10.
158. See id.
159. See ICCT Commentaries, supra note 92.
160. See Second Report, supra note 23, 11 52.
161. Id. 1 53. The Islamic State has recently suffered several military setbacks in Libya,
which has some observers worried that fighters will spill into Europe as they are routed
from Sirte. See Nick Squires, Islamic State Fighters Fleeing Besieged Libyan City Could
Cross the Mediterranean in Migrant Boats, Italy Warns, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 14, 2016, 1:13
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/14/islamic-state-fighters-fleeing-besieged-
libyan-city-could-cross/.
162. See Second Report, supra note 23, 1 55.
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is not even in a position to implement legislation or policies to control
potential fighters.16 3 Only two Member States can receive advanced
passenger information, yet their systems are not computerized, 164 and
one state has no ability to process such information.6 r5
Countries from the Lake Chad Basin, such as Cameroon, Chad,
Niger, and Nigeria, also lack some of the technical capabilities needed to
suppress the flow of FTFs.e6 6 For example, while one state has
established a special counterterrorism unit, it lacks the technical
capability and equipment needed to carry out its missions.167 Moreover,
many land border posts in the region lack basic resources like electricity
and Internet access, and, thus, lack access to international databases
and must rely on paper wanted lists.168
Resolution 2178, of course, requires the above-mentioned Member
States to take the same action as any other state, yet that requirement
means little when these states lack the necessary means.16 9 Similarly,
the Resolution obligates Member States to share information and best
counterterrorism practices with other states, 170 yet again, that
obligation is, in effect, inoperable when those on the receiving end
cannot process or use that information.
While there is a global consensus on the need to cooperate between
nations to stop the FTF problem, there is no consensus on what actually
should be done. 171 Some states are wary of adding new measures for fear
of infringing on the human rights of their citizens. 172 In other states, the
obligations of Resolution 2178 have increased legislative burdens. 173 For
example, no Central Asian States have criminalized travel or attempted
travel for terrorism purposes as required by the Resolution,1 74 nor have
any instituted mechanisms to disrupt the financing of FTF travel in the
163. See id. 11 56.
164. Id. 11 57.
165. Id.
166. See Third Report, supra note 23, 1 52.
167. See id.
168. Id. 11 55.
169. See id. 11 89. With regard to states neighboring the conflict zones in the Middle
East, such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Jordan, there is little evidence that these states have
taken the necessary legal, institutional, and practical steps necessary to stop FTFs and
comply with Resolution 2178. See id. 111 78-92.
170. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, 11 11.
171. Second Report, supra note 23, at 1 16.
172. See id. Ji 27-28, 71.
173. Id. 11 64.
174. Id. 11 43.
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region.175 Additionally, no states in the region utilize advanced
passenger screening information.176
West African countries have taken action with regard to
criminalization requirements, but their new counterterrorism laws "do
not generally comply with the criminalization requirements of
Resolution 2178."177 Moreover, there are few or no legislative or
operational measures in place that ensure that those who attempt to
travel to become FTFs are prevented from leaving their country of
origin to travel to conflict zones. 178
Only a small number of Western European States have amended or
added new legislation to comply with the Resolution's criminalization
requirements, while other Member States (like the United States) use
existing criminal laws. 179 And few have instituted advanced passenger
information systems.18 0 European Union members recognize the
transnational nature of the FTF problem and have, thus, strengthened
cooperation efforts with states outside the Union. 181 Yet most nations
must-at the same time-focus on the current European refugee crises,
directing their resources toward that phenomenon and away from
FTFs.182
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that nations like the United
States-with more than capable law enforcement agencies and
counterterrorism strategies-are unable to come up with an effective
solution to stop FTFs before they leave the country. In September 2015,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced a report
analyzing the United States' ability to confront FTF travel. 183 That
report revealed, among other things, that the United States
Government lacks any "comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist
and foreign fighter travel and has failed to maintain a system for
identifying and plugging related gaps in America's defenses." 184 Just as
alarming is that while over 250 fighters from nineteen U.S. states185
175. Id. 1 47.
176. Id. 1166.
177. Third Report, supra note 23, T 64.
178. Id. 1 66.
179. See Second Report, supra note 23, 1 70.
180. Id. ¶ 72.
181. Id. 1 79.
182. See generally Leo Cendrowicz, Refugee Crisis: Europe's Leaders Meet to Tackle
Crisis for the Sixth Time this Year, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/worldleurope/refugee-crisis-europes-leaders-meet-to-tackle-crisis-for-the-sixth-
time-this-year-a6727831.html.
183. See generally HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1.
184. Id. at 22.
185. See id. at 16.
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have traveled from the United States to the Middle East, DHS was only
able to identify twenty-eight people who were stopped before they left
the country, with some fighters able to travel back and forth multiple
times.186 DHS's recommendations to fix these issues, however, appear to
only reiterate the obligations laid down in Resolution 2178, such as to
improve information sharing capabilities. 87 Moreover, because the
United States drafted and introduced the Resolution, arguably, it
should have been able to implement an effective strategy before any
other Member State.
Many states across the globe face the same types of problems. For
example, very few states are able to conduct on-sight missions to conflict
zones, and, therefore, are unable to collect valuable information for
purposes of investigations or prosecutions. 8 8 For purposes of
investigations into FTF travel, evidence, including witnesses, may be
scattered among States of departure, transit, and destination.18 9
IV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING THE FTF PROBLEM
So far Resolution 2178 has proven to be a somewhat ineffective tool
in halting the flow of FTFs to conflict zones. It is wise, then, to
determine whether other options might better serve the interests of the
nations attempting to stop FTFs. What follows is a catalog of those
options. These options focus more on addressing the problem at its root
through community involvement and awareness rather than through
criminal prosecutions that attack the issue at the back end. While
Member States should continue to work inside the framework of
Resolution 2178-as it does recognize "that terrorism will not be
defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence
operations alone" 90 -the focus of these states should be on prevention
and reintegration. Perhaps by doing so, Member States will avoid the
potential human rights concerns mentioned above and possibly receive
better results with regard to stemming the flow of FTFs to conflict zones
and preventing attacks in states of origin as more and more FTFs
return home.
Resolution 2178 calls upon Member States to develop mechanisms
to counter violent extremism, particularly through "social inclusion and
cohesion."' 9 ' However, it is unclear what steps Member States should
186. Id. at 23.
187. See id. at 29.
188. Third Report, supra note 23, 1 32.
189. Id. ¶ 40.
190. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 9, at 2.
191. Id. T 16.
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take to enhance or develop these mechanisms. Moreover, while some
Member States have developed well-intentioned strategies to counter
violent extremism, 192 the focus of most states in implementing
Resolution 2178 has been on apprehension and prosecution, not de-
radicalization or the prevention of radicalization.
A. Involving Affected Communities
One solution may be to engage with communities identified as
having a high likelihood of producing FTFs to both educate and assist
them in deterring future recruits.19 3 Some experts have claimed that up
to ninety-five percent of FTFs are recruited by either friends or
family.1 94 Moreover, more than seventy-five percent of the FTFs in the
United States who have been stopped before they left the country were
apprehended because of concerned family members, friends, or
observant community members. 9 5 Policy makers have recognized the
potential of the strategy. DHS noted in its latest report that the
government should "devise new approaches for encouraging community
members to report suspicious activity, especially signs an individual is
preparing to travel overseas to join a foreign terrorist organization." 9 6
Early on, the GTCF documented the potential benefits of community
involvement in the Hague Marrakech Memorandum.197 The GTCF
suggested reaching out to communities to develop awareness of the FTF
problem, informing the public of the potential for radicalization through
social media and other Internet-based services. 9 8 However, it also
suggested that the awareness be brought in small settings, through
community briefings and tabletop discussions, 99 noting that the
"exploitation of undue attention or misguided media coverage of the
FTFs could contribute to the radicalization of the FTFs." 0 0
192. See First Report, supra note 23, 111 62-63.
193. This strategy may nevertheless be difficult in failed or quasi-failed states where
they lack the ability to implement any strategies whatsoever.
194. Jennifer Newton, 95% of Foreign Fighters Who Join ISIS Are Recruited by Friends
and Family and Radicalisation 'Rarely Occurs in Mosques' Claims Oxford University
Terrorism Expert, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 25, 2015, 3:24 PM), httpJ1/www.dailymaiLo.uklnews/
article-3333146/95-foreign-fighters-join-ISIS-recruited-friends-family-radicalisation-rarely-occurs-
mosques-claims-Oxford-University-terrorism-experthtml
195. See HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
196. Id. at 34.
197. See GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, supra note 80, at 4.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 3.
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The counterargument to this approach is that those communities
will not allow or trust any intervention. 20 1 Indeed, many Muslim
communities distrust CVE efforts because such efforts tend to focus
exclusively on Muslims instead of extremism generally. 202 In fact, in the
past, governments and law enforcement-including the FBI-have used
such CVE efforts to spy on those communities and encourage members
to become informants. 203
B. Counter-Narrative Strategies
Peter Neuman-Director of the International Centre for the Study
of Radicalization and Political Violence-suggests using the stories of
disillusioned returning FTFs to counter ISIS's recruiting success. 204
This strategy would also include decriminalization measures and efforts
to ensure-to the extent possible-that the message being disseminated
is not viewed by potential FTFs as government-sponsored. 205 Neuman
and his researchers created a database of fifty-eight disillusioned
Islamic State fighters who were willing to speak out publicly. 206 From
the stories of those individuals, Neuman was able to identify four
"defection narratives" that detailed why FTFs were most likely to leave
the Islamic State: (1) infighting, (2) brutality against Sunni Muslims, (3)
corruption and un-Islamic behaviors, and (4) quality of life. 207 For
example, many defectors felt that "fighting against other Sunni groups
was wrong, counterproductive and religiously illegitimate."208 The
returnees have given other various reasons for leaving, including the
belief that they would only be fighting the Assad regime; favoritism and
mistreatment by ISIS leaders; and an overall disappointment in their
experience, which was not nearly as exciting or worthwhile as they
initially assumed.209 Some countries have already taken advantage of
201. See Marcy Wheeler, How We Can Fight Terrorism Better in 2016, VICE (Jan. 7,
2016), http://www.vice.com/read/how-we-can-better-combat-terrorism-in-2016.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See PETER R. NEUMANN, VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS, ASSETS: THE NARRATIVES OF
IsLAMIC STATE DEFECTORS 14 (2015), http://icsr.infb/wp-content/uploads/201509/ICSR-Report-
Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratves-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf
205. It is difficult to say, however, how this strategy would work in real time, as
counter-narrative campaigns typically depend on government catalysts.
206. See NEUMANN, supra note 205, at 5.
207. See id. at 10-11.
208. Id. at 10.
209. See id.
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discouraged returnees, or "jaded jihadists," allowing them to tell their
stories in order to convince others not to travel. 210
This strategy may be most effective against potential FTFs from the
West. For example, Western FTFs are predominately chosen as suicide
bombers, which may deter their joining. 211 Moreover, many Westerners
did not anticipate having to live without electricity or basic goods, not to
mention they never received the luxury items and lavish lifestyle they
were promised.212 Thus, the FTFs who might go to Syria or Iraq in
search of "the T-shirt and the pictures" 213 might be dissuaded after
hearing these facts from returnees.
One of the major issues with this strategy, like with most CVE
strategies, is that we may never know if it is actually working. Those in
charge of facilitating the story telling of disillusioned FTFs will
essentially be asked to prove a negative, "an impossible standard."214 No
person who was intending to join a terrorist group but was dissuaded
from doing so by the accounts of returnees will likely come out and say
so. 215 Nevertheless, recognizing this inherent difficulty will be essential
when it comes time to speak of its success.
Combating the Islamic State's pervasive social media campaign and
slick video productions through a counternarrative operation is another
potential option for dissuading potential recruits from joining the
terrorist organization. Scholars and policy makers alike have argued
that one potential way to prevent individuals from joining foreign
terrorist groups is to address the problem at its source by implementing
measures to counter the violent extremist message of groups like the
Islamic State. 216 A counter-message approach, of course, has its own
flaws, especially when the government directs it. For example, messages
coming from the government are likely to be seen as having their own
agendas.2 17  When the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC), an arm of the United States Department of
State, first tried its hand at a propaganda counter-message, the
product-a YouTube video entitled, 'Welcome to ISIS Land"-was a
210. See HOMELAND SEC. REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
211. See id. at 13.
212. See NEUMANN, supra note 205, at 11.
213. See Byman & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 42.
214. See Greg Miller & Scott Higham, In a Propaganda War Against ISIS, the U.S.
Tried to Play by the Enemy's Rules, WASH. POST (May 8, 2015), https/www.washingtonpost
com/world/national-security/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-play-by-the-enemys-
rules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-8ea-0649268f29e story.htmi
215. See id.
216. See GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, supra note 80, at 2-3.
217. See Miller & Higham, supra note 215.
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complete debacle. 218 Some Washington insiders denounced it as
"embarrassing" and potentially helpful to the enemy, and it even
received mocking criticism from comedian John Oliver.219 In short, the
video suffered from a lack of understanding about the motivations of
many fighters and was seen by potential recruits only as a government-
created countermeasure. 220 Therefore, when developing a program for
returning FTFs to spread a counter-message, officials should keep in
mind the failures of the CSCC.
Undermining the Islamic State's narrative is a critical element of
radicalization prevention. 221 Counterterrorism scholars Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr note that "[e]xposing the group's
embellishments and outright fabrications can do a great deal of damage
to the Islamic State's overall appeal." 222 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr
outline a number of ways this can be done, such as challenging the
Islamic State's religious narrative; questioning its narrative of military
success; and exposing its inability to provide public services. 223 Both also
suggest alternative forums for communicating this counternarrative.
For example, they suggest establishing a corps of online counselors who
would mirror the Islamic State recruiters. 224 These individuals would
monitor Islamic State social media posts and identify at-risk
individuals, then connect with the potential recruits privately, allowing
for one-on-one intervention whereby religious ideology and political
grievances can be discussed and anger diffused. 225 Gartenstein and Barr
also suggest "CVE practitioners could create online forums where at-
risk individuals can discuss their political disgruntlement, salafism, or
jihadist ideas with knowledgeable community leaders in a candid, safe
environment." 226
Counter-messaging strategies could see more success in the coming
months as governments invest in technology and manpower. As one
example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has recently
unveiled a new program called Quantitative Crisis Response, which
seeks to develop "automated digital tools that can help operational
partners better understand how information is being used by
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Nathaniel Barr, Fixing How We Fight the Islamic
State's Narrative, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/
fixing-how-we-fight-the-islamic-states-narrative/.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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adversaries and to quantitatively predict and assess-in real time and
at scale-the effects of those campaigns and of countermeasures." 227 In
short, the program will try to better understand how well the
propaganda from groups like ISIS is working in addition to the
effectiveness of counter-messaging campaigns. 228
C. Counter-Content Strategies
Social media giants like Twitter have also worked closely with
governments to remove Islamic State propaganda from the Internet. 229
For example, since the middle of 2015, Twitter has suspended over
125,000 accounts "for threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily
related to ISIS."230 Moreover, the company has attended over forty CVE
events across four continents to help it better combat the
problem. 231And, it has partnered with groups such as People Against
Violent Extremism and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 232 Facebook
and YouTube have likewise worked to remove Islamic State propaganda
from their sites. 233
D. A Setback to Alternative Strategies
Recent events have seriously weakened the move away from
criminal/surveillance measures and toward de-radicalization measures.
On November 13, 2015, a group of terrorists armed with automatic
weapons and explosives killed 129 people while wounding 368 in an
attack in Paris. 234 Soon thereafter, the Islamic State claimed
responsibility for the attacks. 235 It declared that more attacks were to
227. See Patrick Tucker, The Pentagon is Developing a New Suite of Tools to Fight the
Lone Wolf Problem, DEFENSE ONE (June 16, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/technology
/2016/06/pentagon-developing-new-suite-tools-fight-lone-wolf-problem/129154/.
228. Id.
229. See Combatting Violent Extremism, TWITTER: TWITTER BLOGS (Feb. 5, 2016, 8:13
PM), https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See Joseph Menn & Dustin Volz, Exclusive: Google, Facebook Quietly Move Toward
Automatic Blocking of Extremist Videos, REUTERS (June 25, 2016, 10:16 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-extremism-video-exclusive-idUSKCNOZBOOM.
234. Mary Brophy Marcus, Injuries from Paris Attacks Will Take Long to Heal, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015, 5:57 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/injuries-from-paris-
attacks-will-take-long-to-heal/.
235. See Max Fisher, Here Is ISIS's Statement Claiming Responsibility for the
Paris Attacks, VoX (Nov. 14, 2015, 11:27 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/11/14/9734794/
isis-claim-paris-statement.
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come if France continued its air campaign against the terrorist group in
Syria and Iraq. 236 Some of the attackers had fought for the Islamic State
in Syria before committing the attacks and had-in fact-traveled freely
back and forth from Europe to Syria multiple times. 237 Then, on
December 2, 2015, two individuals attacked a holiday party in San
Bernardino, California, killing fourteen and wounding twenty-two. 238
The attackers, a husband and wife, pledged allegiance to the Islamic
State on social media shortly before they were killed in a shootout with
police. 239 Then again, on March 22, 2016, three bombs exploded at
separate locations in Brussels, Belgium, killing thirty-five people and
wounding more than three hundred. 240 The Islamic State claimed
responsibility for the attacks and warned of more attacks in the future if
Belgium continued its military strikes against the terrorist group. 241
Finally, on Sunday, June 12, 2016, a lone gunman entered a nightclub
in Orlando, Florida, and killed forty-nine people and wounded fifty-
three more, in the worst mass shooting in United States' history.242 The
gunman, who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State prior to the attack,
was interviewed by the FBI in 2013 and 2014 but was not found to be a
threat.243
These attacks have changed the debate on everything from the
refugee crises to how the FTF issue should be handled. Citizens,
politicians, and policy makers alike have called for stricter measures to
address these issues, which will surely call into question the
implementation of the strategies outlined above.
236. See id.
237. See Unraveling the Connections Among the Paris Attackers, N.Y. TIMES (last
updated Mar. 18, 2015), httpAvww.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/l1/15/world/europe/manhunt-
for-paris-attackers.htmL
238. Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation So Far,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:03 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/cabfornialla-me-san-
bernardino-shooting-terror-investigation-htmlstory.html.
239. See id.
240. See Catherine E. Shoichet, Brussels Attacks: Charges Filed, a Man Freed and
Suspects on the Run, CNN (Mar. 28, 2016, 8:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/europe
/brussels-investigationlindex.html.
241. Sheldon Chad, Christina Boyle & Corina Knoll, Hunt Is on for Brussels Bombing
Suspect; Islamic State Warns of More, Worse Attacks, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:20 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/europella-fg-brussels-airport-explosion-20160322-
story.html.
242. See Ralph Ellis, Ashley Fantz, Faith Karimi & Eliott C. McLaughlin, Orlando
Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Allegiance, CNN (June 13, 2016, 11:05 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/.
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For instance, president-elect Donald Trump has called for a "total
and complete" ban on Muslims entering the United States. 244
Additionally, after the Paris attacks, some United States politicians
have called for the maintenance of the controversial NSA surveillance
program that allows for the collection of U.S. citizens' phone data, with
Senator Marco Rubio claiming that "[t]he Paris terrorist attacks remind
us that no corner of the free world is safe from these savages, and it is
our duty to defeat them by any means necessary." 245 Additionally, the
United Nations Security Council passed a new French-sponsored
resolution after the Paris attacks, which calls "on all nations to redouble
and coordinate action to prevent further attacks by Islamic State
terrorists and other extremist groups." 246 In terms of new legislation,
the European Union has implemented the provisions of Resolution 2178
into its legal framework. 247 Among other things, the European Union's
directive now criminalizes "[tiravelling for terrorist purposes, both
within and outside the EU, to counter the phenomenon of foreign
terrorist fighters."248
Countries have also acted quickly to revise their immigration laws
in response to some attacks. For example, the United States has altered
its visa waiver program-a program that permits visa-free travel into
the United States for citizens of thirty-eight partner countries-to add
stricter security measures. 249 In the same vein, some European Union
Member States are now doing away with passport-free travel across
their borders inside the Schengen Zone, with some calling the border
between Denmark and Sweden "the new iron curtain."250 These
244. Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald Trump Calls for 'Total' Ban on Muslims
Entering the United States, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2015/12/07/e56266f6-9d2b-11e5-8728-lafaf2O8198_story.html.
245. Jordain Carney, Rubio Backs Push to Delay NSA Reforms After Paris Attacks, THE
HILL (Nov. 18, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/260591-rubio-
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246. Edith M. Lederer, UN Calls on World to Redouble Action Against ISIS, BOSTON
GLOBE (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2015/11/20/calls-world-
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247. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/6218, European Agenda on
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248. Id.
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250. Matthew Holehouse & Richard Orange, Schengen Zone in Danger, Warns Germany,
After Denmark and Sweden Introduce Border Controls, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 4, 2016, 3:25
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12080906/Schengen-zone-in-
danger-warns-Germany-after-Denmark-and-Sweden-introduce-border-controls.html.
340
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2178 (2014)
measures potentially show that the push for radicalization prevention
policies is unlikely, and the recent attack in Orlando by a self-
radicalized U.S. citizen shows that counternarrative strategies are not
reaching everyone.251
It seems that at the end of the day criminalization and surveillance
measures will continue to be pushed while CVE efforts will be kicked
down the road as legislators and policy makers hastily respond to the
next attack-perhaps by continuing to implement the criminalization
elements of Resolution 2178. This, of course, is a bad approach long
term.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be no end in sight to the global FTF crisis, but
many submitted solutions appear to be no more than reiterations of the
failed obligations of Member States under Resolution 2178, such as
information sharing and enhanced border controls, with little being said
of CVE and similar efforts. 252 A solution to these issues is, perhaps, to
increase the use of the inclusion and cohesion policy initiatives laid out
above. These measures are more forward-looking and are better able to
traverse human rights and international law conflicts. Additionally,
they are potentially more effective in the long run, as they purport to
solve the problem at its source rather than reacting to FTFs already
radicalized. Finally, Member States that lack ample prosecutorial and
investigative resources are, perhaps, more readily able to implement
these measures.
251. See David Fidler, The Orlando Massacre and the Conundrum of Online
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